Databases and Lawful Users: the chink in the armour by Waelde, Charlotte
1
Databases and lawful users: The Chink in the Armour
Charlotte Waelde*
The Database Directive,1 maligned by some2 but loved by others,3 was the subject of a 
review by the European Commission in 2005.  In looking to its operation primarily from 
the perspective of the database industry the Commission came to the considered view 
that the economic impact of the sui generis right on database production was unproven.4   
Far from increasing investment in the creation of databases in Europe as had been 
anticipated and on the basis of which the measure had been justified5, the industry had 
not expanded and despite the belief of some database makers, there was no empirical 
evidence to show that measures in the Directive were to their benefit.  The Commission 
even went so far as to suggest that one possibility was to repeal the Directive in its
entirety.6
The enquiry in this discussion is as to the possibilities the Database Directive might hold
for a lawful user of the contents of a protected database.  The focus is as between the 
maker of the database7 and the original licensee (rather than further downstream use).  
Are there any benefits for this group of users in retaining the Directive?  Should the 
interests of this group be considered before final decisions are made on the future of the 
right?
                                                
*Dr Charlotte Waelde.  Co-director AHRC Research Centre for Studies in Intellectual Property and 
Technology Law and Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Edinburgh.
1 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal 
Protection of Databases OJ L 77, 27.3.1996, p. 20-28 (hereafter Database Directive)
2 The criticisms tend to focus on the introduction of the right as being unnecessary and/or that the 
limitations on the database right do not do enough to balance the scope of the right.  e.g. Reichman, J.H 
and Samuelson, P, Intellectual Property Rights in Data? (1997) 50 Vanderbilt Law Review 51; Cornish and 
Llewellyn Intellectual Property Rights Sweet & Maxwell 5th ed. 2003, Para 19.42; Freedman, CD Should 
Canada Enact a New Sui Genreis Database Right? (2002) 13 Fordham Intellectual Property Media & 
Entertainment LJ 35, Lipton, J. Balancing Private Rights and Public Policies:  Reconceptualising Property in Databases’
2003 Berkeley Technology LJ 773
3 Those involved in the database industry are particularly keen on the right.  See in general First evaluation 
of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases Brussels 12 December 2005. (hereafter First 
Evaluation).
4 Ibid para 1.4
5 Database Directive Recitals 7, 9, 10, 12.
6 First Evaluation Para 6.1.
7 The maker of the database is the person who has expended the relevant investment in the obtaining, 
verification and/or presentation of the contents of the database.  Database Directive Article 7.
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This examination takes place within a much broader discussion as to the proper 
protection of scientific data.  Multifarious strands are entangled in the debate.8  How can 
or should investment in the collation of data be protected or rewarded without impeding 
the progress of science?9  Should data or the investment in the collation of data be 
protected at all or rather should the data be used to support future progress?  When 
public funding supports the discovery of scientific data should that data be regarded as a 
‘public good’ and thus accessible at a reasonable cost and re-usable in the name of 
progress?10  When data are held across jurisdictions do differences in laws impede 
progress?11  Whereas one can envisage the creation of a contractual nexus between data 
collators and users which encourages innovative use of data, the development of 
derivates and downstream products, how can such a framework be constructed when an 
overriding concern for some is the protection of investment in the collation of the 
data?12  Is the free market and private bargaining really the best mechanism for 
safeguarding the public interest in the progress of science? As will be discussed below, 
absent the database Directive and its provisions for lawful users there would appear little 
to prevent control exerted through private ordering dictating use and re-use of datum 
even in the face of the well-known mantra that facts as such cannot be protected. 
To illustrate the argument the example of geospatial data and geospatial databases will be 
used.  In this sector there appears to be widespread confusion as to the nature and extent 
of the rights that subsist in a geospatial database and consequently little understanding of 
the exceptions for users.  In this paper it will be argued that, as a result of the 
introduction of the Database Directive in 1996, the relevant right in a geospatial database 
is the sui generis database right.  The discussion will go on to examine the rights of 
lawful users vis a vis the maker of a geospatial database and its contents.
                                                
8 See generally Digital Data and Information for Science: Proceedings of an International Symposium (2004) Esanu, M.  
and Uhlir P (eds), U.S. National Committee for CODATA, National Research Council 2004.Available 
from http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11030.html (hereafter Digital Data).
9 Reichman J and Uhlir P A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data: International
Considerations in Digital Data
10 See e.g. Science, Technology and Innovation for the 21st Century. Meeting of the OECD Committee for 
Scientific and Technological Policy at Ministerial Level, 29-30 January 2004 - Final Communique at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/15/0,2340,en_2649_34487_25998799_1_1_1_1,00.html
11 See generally Digital Data Session 1: Legal, Economic, and Technological Framework for Open Access 
and the Public Domain in Digital Data and Information for Science pp 15-40
12 See generally Digital Data Session 5: Innovative Models for Public-Domain Production of and Open 
Access to Scientific and Technical Data and Information pp 95-160.
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What is geospatial data?
Geospatial data are information or data about the world around us.  Some refer to 
geographic information or data as ‘information that can be related to a location defined in terms of 
point, area, volume on or of the earth, at a specific point in time, particularly information on natural 
phenomena, cultural and human resources’13.  Others prefer to use the term geospatial 
information (or data) arguing that it ‘is more precise in many … contexts than ‘geographic,’ 
because geospatial information is often used in ways that do not involve a graphic representation, or map, 
of the information’.14 The term ‘geospatial data’ will be used in this discussion and 
‘geospatial database’ to refer to the database that holds the geospatial data.
Geospatial data are used in many different walks of life.  One, and probably the best 
known to the majority, is the mapping business.15  But geospatial data are also used to 
deduce information about the world about us for many other reasons.  For instance to 
plan the location of wind farms in the most environmentally friendly way possible; to 
predict where crimes are most likely to take place; to maintain overview of the location 
of underground pipes to ensure the most appropriate maintenance.16  With increasingly 
sophisticated techniques being developed in the ways in which data are captured and 
manipulated, the range of possibilities for the use of geospatial data are growing all the 
time.17  
Perhaps surprisingly few statistics are publicly available which would indicate the size of 
the sector, at least not comparing like with like.  In 1996 DG XIII estimated that the 
amount invested by governments, commercial and industrial organisations for the 
collection, provision and use of geospatial information in Europe was 10 billion ECU per 
year (£6.6 billion).18 In 1997 NOP estimated that the total UK domestic market for 
geospatial data was valued at £204m.19 At a slightly later date, 1999, OXERA claimed 
                                                
13 http://www.gipanel.org.uk/gipanel/docs/GIPanelMinutesSept05approved.pdf
14 http://www.opengeospatial.org/resources/?page=glossary#G
15 For example maps produced by Ordnance Survey http://www.ordnancesurvey.co.uk/oswebsite/; 
Getmapping at http://www1.getmapping.com/home.asp
16
 Examples taken from http://www.mapzone.co.uk/giszone/english/
17 See also Rao, M. Geospatial Information for Development Open Access and the Public Domain in Digital Data.
18 DG XIII (GI2000 initiative) (1996), Towards a European Policy Framework for Geographical Information: A 
Working Document,  November 1996.
19 OS (1998), 'Marketing Strategy', November.
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that Ordnance Survey data underpinned £79 - £136bn of economic activity in the UK.20   
In 2005 it was estimated that in Scotland at least 80% of government information had a 
geographic basis.21   What the statistics do is to indicate that, economically, this is a large 
sector and one which is growing.
The creation of a geospatial database
Data fed into a geospatial database can be gathered from a variety of sources. Historically 
at least, some geospatial database makers digitised paper copy maps, feeding the derived 
information into the database.22  That process appears less common now as increasingly 
sophisticated techniques are developed.  These include gathering data captured directly 
from images taken from aeroplanes and satellites and by running an electronic cursor 
over these images;23 from surveyors working in the field directly inputting data on 
physical features on the ground into the database;24 from Global Positioning System 
(GPS) data generated by satellites orbiting the earth producing signals which are in turn 
captured by GPS receivers.25  In addition information obtained from third parties may be 
included in the database, such as local census information; details submitted by builders 
of recent housing developments and information from utility owners as to the 
positioning of cables and pipes.
Each individual piece of datum, such as information as to the location of a tree or a 
house, may be assigned a unique identifying number depending on the manner in which 
the database maker has designed the database. Sometimes the unique identifying 
numbers are automatically assigned by the database software used.  This is then 
represented as vector26 or raster27 data in the database each element of which is defined
in relation to other features within the database.
                                                
20 http://www.ordnancesurvey.co.uk/oswebsite/aboutus/reports/oxera/index.html
21 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/Open-scotland/OneScotland/Introduction




25 For information on the GPS see http://www.colorado.edu/geography/gcraft/notes/gps/gps_f.html
26 Vector data are captured as points, lines (which consist of a series of point coordinates), or areas (which 
are shapes bounded by lines).  All that the computer stores of vector data are a set of ‘xy’ coordinates 
making up the shape of an object (for example a tree).  In other words, the data represents the object.  
27 Raster data are represented by coloured rows of uniform cells (much like a grid) which are coded 
according to the data values.  The data stored in the cells represents the nature of the object on the ground.  
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The data when connected to its identifying number looks like this:
Figure 1.
These data are then manipulated using a software program to render it in a form that is 
meaningful to the user.  The whole, the data and the software program used to 
manipulate the data, is referred to as a Geographic Information System or GIS.
When manipulated, for example to form a map, the outcome could look like this
Figure 2.
The choices as to how the data are represented, for instance if the outlines of the 
buildings are to be blue or red, whether the trees are to be green or pink, what level of 
data are required for the particular purpose, are all made by the individual who runs the 
data through the computer program.  Thus it is essential to appreciate that there are two 
different stages:  the one is the gathering of the geospatial data and the representation of 
that data in the database relative to all the other locational data within the database.  The 
second, and quite separate process, is the manipulation of that data to render it in a form 
meaningful to the user.
The enquiry in this paper is as to the first process:  the gathering of the geospatial data 
and organisation within the database.  The issue is as to the rights in the database and 
then the relationship between the maker of the database and the party to whom access 
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and permission to extract and re-utilise the contents is given.  Where the sui generis 
database right subsists in the database, this person is called the ‘lawful user’.28
The rights in a geospatial database.
It appears to have only been in recent years that the nature of the intellectual property 
rights subsisting in a geospatial database has been the subject of debate.  There seems to 
have been a loosely articulated or unspoken assumption in some jurisdictions that 
copyright is the relevant IP right.  This may have been because, historically, the major use 
of geospatial data was to create maps.  In Britain a map is protected by artistic copyright 
under the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA).29  At the time when this 
provision was introduced maps would have been created by surveyors measuring and 
locating physical features on the ground and representing them in map form.  Now, as 
described above, the process differs significantly with the majority of data being directly 
inputted into a geospatial database whether by surveyors working on the ground, by the 
extraction of data from images taken from aeroplanes or satellites, or, increasingly, co-
ordinates being taken directly from satellite data flows (the GPS system).
Whether, and the extent to which copyright might subsist in satellite or aerial imagery 
which might then be infringed by the representation of that information in co-ordinate 
form within a geospatial database must be for a separate enquiry.30  This discussion will 
proceed on the basis that the geospatial data are obtained from the GPS system and 
accordingly, once allocated a unique identifying number, looks like the list represented in 
Figure 1 above.  The argument will be made that it is the sui generis database right that is 
the relevant IP right.
The Database Directive
Prior to the implementation of the Database Directive it might have been argued that 
copyright subsisted in the geospatial data as shown in Figure 1 as a table or compilation 
                                                
28 Lawful user is not defined in the Database Directive but the person to whom this might refer is 
discussed below.
29 As a graphic work.  Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 s 4(2)(a).
30 In the context of US law and alluding to the uncertainly surrounding copyright and geospatial data see 
Licensing Geographic Data and Services,  Committee on Licensing Geographic Data and Services, National 
Research Council ISBN: 0-309-09267-1, (2004) (Hereafter Licensing Geographic Data and Services) pp 
103 – 114.
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within the meaning of the CDPA31.  However, in implementing the Directive changes 
were made to the CDPA which now provides that a literary work includes ‘a table or 
compilation other than a database [emphasis added]’.32 Thus the first port of call is to ascertain 
whether a collection of geospatial data falls under the definition of a database.  Only if it 
did not would it be necessary to look to the law on literary copyright in tables and 
compilations.
The Directive provides for copyright protection for those databases which, by reason of 
the selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author’s own intellectual 
creation33 although copyright protection is not extended to the contents of the database.34  
The contents may, where the requisite criteria are met, be protected by copyright in their 
own right (such as copyright subsisting in an article included in a database).  The sui 
generis database right35 gives to the maker of the database (the person who provides the 
investment necessary for such compilation)36 exclusive rights to prevent unauthorised 
extraction and re-utilisation of the whole or a substantial part of the contents of the 
database,37 (the sui generis right) which may be licensed or sold to third parties.  It is the 
sui generis right that is the focus of this discussion.
The ECJ and the Database Directive
Since its introduction the extent of the sui generis right has been the subject of much 
speculation.  Many thought the right over broad in that it protected data as such and thus 
went far beyond any protection that would have previously been accorded by copyright.38  
However, in 2005 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had the opportunity to rule on 
                                                
31 CDPA S 3(1)(a).  Express Newspapers v Liverpool Daily Post and Echo [1985] 1 W.L.R. 1089 tables 
comprising grids of five-letter sequences for a monthly newspaper competition; Exchange Telegraph Co Ltd v 
Gregory & Co [1896] 1 Q.B. 147 a list of Stock Exchange prices; Payen Components South Africa Ltd v Bovis 
Gaskets C.C. (1996) 33 I.P.R. 406 (South Africa) a price list; Microsense Systems Ltd v Control Systems Technology 
Ltd noted at  [1992] I.P.D. 15006 three-letter mnemonics comprising the language code for 
communication with a pelican crossing controller.
32
 CDPA s 3(1)(a) 
33




 Database Directive Chapter III
36
 Database Directive Article 7.  
37
 Database Directive Article 8.
38 See articles cited at fn 2.
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the interpretation of a number of provisions of the Directive referred to it in four cases.39  
Of these cases one concerned details of horseracing fixtures,40 the three others details of 
football league matches.41  In giving judgement the ECJ stressed that data as such were 
not the object of protection, but that the purpose of the sui generis right was to ‘promote 
the establishment of storage and processing systems for existing information.’42 Given the stress the 
ECJ laid upon this justification for the right, it provides a backdrop against which the 
extent of the sui generis right should be considered. 
Does a geospatial database meet the definition of a database?
In order to benefit from the regime set out in the Database Directive, a database has to 
meet the definition set out in Article 1(2).  It should be:
‘a collection of independent works, data or other material arranged in a systematic or methodical way and 
individually accessible by electronic or other means.’43
Questions referred to the ECJ included requests for clarification of this definition.
Independent materials
In Fixtures Marketing Ltd  v Organismos prognostikon agonon podosfairou AE (OPAP), 44 the 
ECJ ruled that, to be classified as a database there had to be a collection of ‘independent 
materials’ which should be ‘separable from one another without their informative, literary, artistic, 
                                                
39
British Horseracing Board v William Hill C-203/02 (from the Court of Appeal, England and Wales) 
(hereafter BHB); Fixtures Marketing Ltd. v Svenska Spel AB C-338/02 (from the Hogsta Domstol, Sweden) 
(hereafter Svenska); Fixtures Marketing Ltd v OY Veikkaus Ab C-46/02 (from the Vantaan Darajaoikeus, 
Finland) (hereafter Veikkaus); and Fixtures Marketing Ltd. v Organismoa Prognostikon Agnon Podosfairou (OPAP) 
C-444/02) (from the Monomeles Protodikio Athinion, Greece) (hereafter OPAP).  The opinions were 




 Svenska, OPAP and Veikkaus  
42
 BHB Para 31
43
 The wording of the CDPA is similar: ‘database’ means a collection of independent works, data or other 
material which –a.  are arranged in a systematic or methodical way, and b.  are individually accessible by 




musical or other value being affected’ 45  and  ‘systematically or methodically arranged and individually 
accessible in one way or another.’46  
Thus a number of tests require to be satisfied:
 The data/information/materials need to be independent
 The data/information/materials need to be separable without their informative 
value being affected
 The data/information/materials need to be systematically or methodically 
arranged and individually accessible
Arranged in a systematic or methodical way and individually accessible
In dealing with the requirement that the materials should be ‘arranged in a systematic or 
methodical way’ the ECJ in OPAP stated:
‘While it is not necessary for the systematic or methodical arrangement to be physically apparent… that 
condition implies that the collection should be contained in a fixed base, of some sort, and include 
technical means such as electronic, electromagnetic or electro-optical processes … or other means, such as 
an index, a table of contents, or a particular plan or method of classification, to allow the retrieval of any 
independent material contained within it.’47
Within a geospatial database data are arranged in forms and fields in a systematic way 
such that the data on one particular aspect (such as the location of McEwan Hall in 
Edinburgh) are arranged systematically by reference to all the other information in the 
database both around the information itself (e.g. other buildings in Edinburgh) and more
broadly (e.g. the location of McEwan Hall within Scotland).  The base is fixed – the 
geospatial database.  Technical means are provided for the retrieval of the information –
querying the database for specific purposes and by which independent material (the 
name of McEwan Hall) can be retrieved.  
                                                
45
 OPAP Para 29
46
 OPAP Para 30
47
 Ibid Para 30.  In OPAP the ECJ was satisfied that the criteria for independence and systematic 
arrangement were met by the arrangement of data according to ‘dates, times and names of teams in those 
various football matches’. Para 35
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Independent materials and informative value
If only one element of the geospatial data are taken is that independent and does that 
have informative value?  Any element of geospatial data are represented, within the 
database, relative to all other elements in the database.  It might be argued that a single 
piece of datum, for instance representing information on the location of McEwan Hall, 
would be meaningless unless there is data present representing other features, such as the 
location of the road running beside the Hall and its relation to other buildings in the 
vicinity, and by virtue of which the location of the hall can both be calculated and 
understood.  In other words, if the datum that is taken represents only one ‘floating fact’, 
is it independent and have informative value?  The answer to this must be in the 
affirmative.  However ‘useless’ a single floating fact might seem to some that fact 
nonetheless is of informative value.  It may be unusual to take one piece of datum (the 
height of McEwan Hall) and use that but it is not the use that is the focus of the enquiry.  
The datum is separable (independent) without its informative value being affected.
The argument is all the stronger if consideration is given to larger parts of the database as 
falling within the definition of ‘independent works, data or other materials.’  So instead 
of individual datum, the focus could be on data sets. Reverting to the example of 
McEwan Hall, that dataset might contain a number of records with each record 
containing the following information:  location, name, height. The dataset could easily fit 
within the definition of independent materials.   Here, the juxtaposition of the name, 
location and height would certainly have autonomous informative value and be separable 
from, for instance, the data representing the nature of the remainder of Edinburgh.
Does a geospatial database qualify for the sui generis right of extraction and re-
utilisation?
Merely because a geospatial database falls within the definition of a database, it does not 
thereby mean that it will also attract the sui generis right.48  For the right to subsist there 
has to be have been substantial investment on the obtaining, verifying or presenting the 
                                                
48
 In each of the cases considered by the ECJ the material fell within the definition of a database.  In BHB 
the ECJ gave a strong steer to the effect that the database did not qualify for the sui generis right because 
of the absence of relevant investment.
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contents of a database consisting in the deployment of financial resources, and/or the 
expending of time, effort and energy.49
Obtaining
Despite the ECJs attempts to clarify what amounts to the relevant investment in 
‘obtaining’ data for the purposes of the subsistence of the database right, questions do 
remain.  The ECJ said the relevant investment ‘must…  be understood to refer to the resources 
used to seek out existing independent materials and collect them in the database and not [emphasis 
added] to resources used for the creation as such of independent materials’.50  So the materials to be 
placed in the database must already exist as independent materials. Any investment 
expended in creation of materials will not count towards the subsistence of the sui 
generis right. Only when those materials exist, and thereafter investment is expended in 
the collection of those materials, will this criterion be met.  
But what is collected and what is created?  In British Horseracing Board v William Hill
(BHB)51 the database in question comprised inter alia information on over one million 
horses, and in particular pre race information on races held in the UK.  The latter 
information included the name, place and date of the race concerned, the distance over 
which the race is to be run, the criteria for eligibility to enter the race, the date by which 
entries must be received, the entry fee payable and the amount of money the racecourse 
was to contribute to the prize money.  When trying to find the line between the creation 
and the collation of the data, the ECJ said that the investment in the selection of the 
horses admitted to run in the race concerned related to the creation of the data which 
made up the lists for those races.52  BHB had expended resources to establish (emphasis 
added) the date, the time, the place and/or name of the race and this was investment in 
the creation of materials contained in the BHB database and not in their collation.53  Thus 
it would seem that if the data do not exist as such, then any investment expended in 
establishing what that data are amounts to creation of the information and not mere 
                                                
49
 Database Directive Recital 40; Article 7.
50




 Ibid Para 38.
53
 Ibid Para 80
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collation. Thus the investment by BHB was not relevant when considering the criterion 
of obtaining for the subsistence of the database right.
So what of the data in a geospatial database?  Are they created or collated?  Is the 
material established for the purposes of incorporating it into a geospatial database?  Or is 
it already created merely awaiting collation?
There can be no doubt that geospatial data exists – a point that argues in favour of a 
finding that the data are collated and not created.  The location and height of McEwan 
Hall exist whether or not that information is recorded in any particular form.  It is 
certainly the case that operations are carried out on those data, but many of these are 
carried out relative to the other data within the database.  Thus, for example, the 
information relating to any particular object needs to be represented in relation to all 
other objects within the database; the unique identifying number will be allocated.  But 
that is to ensure that the data are represented as they should be within the database and 
relative to other data.  It is not, in other words, done in order to create or establish the 
information.54
In addition, and unlike the position in BHB where it was only BHB who was in a 
position to establish the information on horse races, it is open to anyone to collate 
geospatial data.  Considerations of financial resources aside, geospatial data from, for 
example, satellite imagery, from images obtained from pictures taken by aircraft or from 
the GPS system55 can be acquired by anyone.56  
Verification
The Directive also talks of investment in the verification of the contents of a database as 
being relevant for the subsistence of the sui generis right.
                                                
54 For a discussion concerning ‘official’ databases in light of the Court of Appeals determination of the 
BHB case see Kon, S and Heide, T BHB/William Hill – Europe’s Feist 2006 EIPR, 60-66
55 It would appear that the majority of information from the GPS system is freely available 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Positioning_System
56 It may be that the controllers of the satellites filter what data are available within the GPS system.  For 
example, in the interests of national security, certain data may be filtered out.
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In relation to this point the ECJ has said the expression ‘investment in … the … verification 
… of the contents of a database must be understood to refer to the resources used, with a view to ensuring 
the reliability of the information contained in that database, to monitor the accuracy of the materials 
collected when the database was created and during its operation’.57
It would seem that any relevant investment in verification of the data must take place at 
the point at which the data enters the database (the accuracy of the materials collected 
when the database was created) and once the data are in the database (during its 
operation) rather than verification in the course of creating data i.e. verification 
establishing whether the data are correct in the first place (is McEwan hall really there?).  
So when might investment in relevant verification take place for geospatial data?  
Looking to the processes of collection of data, when a surveyor is out in the field, she 
may take measurements of a particular building.  Verification that takes place at the point 
of collection of the data (when the measurements are taken – are they correct?) should 
not count for relevant investment.  However, once the data has been collected, there may
be special features built into the database that would check that particular entry against 
other entries within the database – a process that might be carried out automatically 
(through the operation of a program in which investment has been expended) or 
manually – through the operation of certain choices made by an individual manipulating 
the software.  So, for example, if the height of the McEwan building in Edinburgh is 
(erroneously) entered, through either automatic or manual processes it could be 
established that such a measurement is impossible, thus enabling the correct figure to be 
re-checked and amended accordingly.  The relevant investment for the verification of the 
data would be the processes of checking – and not the establishment of the correct 
measurement when it was discovered the first was wrong.
It may be that substantial investment has been expended in developing software that 
checks the accuracy of the data when entered into the database or once in there.  At this 
point is should be stressed that the Directive makes it clear that the term database does 
not extend to computer programs used in the making or operation of a database58 and 
that protection under the Directive does not apply ‘to computer programs used in the making or 
                                                
57
 OPAP para 43
58
 Database Directive Recital 23.
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operation of databases… .59 As computer programs have their own framework of protection 
in the Computer Programs Directive60 it would appear this is intended to avoid 
cumulation of protection.  However there appears no reason that would preclude either 
the investment necessary in developing a computer program that would support the 
verification of the data, or indeed the investment necessary in operating a program which 
enabled data to be verified from being counted towards the investment necessary for the 
subsistence of the sui generis right.61  It is just that the protection does not extend or 
apply to the computer program per se.  
Presentation
On the relevant investment concerning the presentation of the contents, the ECJ in 
OPAP, Svenska, and Veikkaus said that this referred to:
‘ ... the resources used for the purpose of giving the database its function of processing information, that is 
to say those used for the systematic or methodical arrangement of the materials contained in that database 
and the organisation of their individual accessibility.’62
It appears that the relevant investment is that which is linked to the presentation features 
that are integral to the processing system as such, and not the presentation features that 
would count towards the ‘look’ of the end product.  Thus, in a geospatial database, the 
relevant ‘presentation’ investment would relate to the way in which the data were
arranged within the database itself (in the fields within the geospatial database for 
example).  What it would not appear to cover is the investment needed to present the 
data in its final form – for instance whether the roads are coloured red or blue.
                                                
59
 Database Directive Article 1(3)
60
 Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs
61
 See e.g. Aplin, T, Copyright Law in the Digital Society:  The Challenges of Multimedia Hart Publishing 2005 
(hereafter Aplin) questioning whether investment in a computer program as such would be counted as 
relevant investment (in the context of presentation) but noting that if none of the investment could be 
counted it would be difficult to envisage what kind of investment could be applied to presentation of the 
contents that did not relate to the design of the underlying software. P. 70.
62
 OPAP para  43; Svenska para 27; Veikkaus para 37
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Such a conclusion would make sense in that any skill, labour and effort63 (intellectual 
creation64) that goes towards the final presentation of the geospatial data in the form of 
the final product, for example the manipulation of the data through a GIS to create a 
map will be concerned with copyright subsisting in that product.  It can thus be 
separated from, and does not overlap with, the sui generis database right which is solely 
concerned with the investment needed in developing the means by which the 
information can be processed.  
Extraction and re-utilisation
There are powerful arguments for saying that a collection of geospatial data within a 
database meets the definition of a database within the Database Directive and that 
relevant investment is expended in obtaining, verification and presentation of the data.  
Thus a geospatial database would qualify for the sui generis right.  What then is the 
extent of the right?
As discussed above, the rights of the maker are to prevent the extraction and/or re-
utilisation of a substantial part of the contents of the database without authorisation.65  
The Database Directive defines extraction as the permanent or temporary transfer of all 
or a substantial part of the contents of a database to another medium by any means or in 
any form,66 and re-utilisation to mean any form of making available to the public all or a 
substantial part of the contents of a database by the distribution of copies, by renting, by 
on-line or other forms of transmission.67  In other words, if a substantial part of the 
contents of a geospatial database are printed out, placed on a CD Rom or other medium 
that will infringe the right of extraction, and if a substantial part of the contents are 
distributed to the public for instance over the Internet, that will infringe the right of re-
utilisation. 
                                                
63 The requirement for copyright subsistence in the UK:  Ladbroke v William Hill [1964] 1 All E R 465 at 
469.
64 The requirement for the subsistence of copyright in the organisation of a database.  Database Directive 
Article 3.1.
65 Database Directive Article 7.1.
66
 Database Directive Article 7.2.(a).
67
 Database Directive Article 7.2.(b).
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In BHB the ECJ said that as acts of unauthorised extraction and re-utilisation from a 
source other than the database concerned ‘are liable … to prejudice the investment of the maker 
of the database’ so, ‘direct access to the database was not a prerequisite’ for infringement of the 
right.68  Further, while the sui generis right does not extend to cover consultation of a 
database,69 the consent of the maker of the database to consultation does not entail 
exhaustion of the sui generis right.  Thus, it does not matter whether the data are 
extracted or re-utilised directly from the geospatial database, or through the medium of a 
third party.  If a substantial part of the contents of a protected geospatial database is in 
issue, then the rights of extraction and re-utilisation will be infringed no matter the 
source of the data.  
Exploitation of a geospatial database
Assuming that the argument is correct to this stage; that the sui generis database right 
subsists in a database containing a collection of geospatial data, how then might the 
contents of that database be exploited by the maker?  Generally the relationship between 
the database maker and the first user will be contract.70  This may be a contractual 
relationship formed on-line (such as the contract between Google Earth and users71) or 
perhaps by way of a paper based contractual relationship beyond the digital environment 
combined with an on-line contract at the point of use.72  The terms and conditions of use 
may be shaped by the underlying law of copyright or database right depending on the 
understanding of the database maker (and user) of the relevant rules.73  There is no legal 
obligation to give access to the contents of a database to a third party whether or not 
                                                
68
 BHB Para 53.
69
 Ibid para 54.
70 Oddly, in the First Evaluation the Commission seemed to think that the existence of the Database Right 
would mean that databases would be ‘openly’ available (presumably in the sense of not incorporating 
access restrictions).  This is drawn from the discussion  in Para 5.1 where the Commission state, that as a 
result of the interpretation the ECJ gave to ‘obtaining’ ‘It can be expected that database makers will devise legal 
strategies to get around the distinction drawn in the ECJ judgments and that this might result in online databases increasingly 
being secured by systems of access.’ It would be interesting to know whether any database maker who wished to 
gain monetary return from granting a lawful user rights in respect of the contents of a database made the 
database available without access controls and relied solely on what was thought to be the extent of the sui 
generis right.  As the ECJ said in BHB: ‘Of course, the maker of a database can reserve exclusive access to his database 
to himself or reserve access to specific people’. Para 55.
71 http://earth.google.com/
72 Clearly here there are issues as to the incorporation of terms into the contract:  contract law will 
determine whether the bargain is validly created which terms have been incorporated.
73 See Licensing Geographic Data and Services p 114.
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rights subsist in the contents of the database.  As was pointed out in Attheraces Ltd v 
British Horse Racing Board74
‘I agree with BHB that it is entitled, in principle, to impose a charge for use of its pre-race data..…, 
whether or not BHB has IP rights in respect of the data, and, in particular, database rights under the 
Databases Directive and the Databases Regulations or copyright, and irrespective of the extent of any 
such rights. BHB has, in the data, a valuable commodity, for which it is entitled to charge. There is no 
authority to the contrary, including the William Hill case’.75
Competition law may well come in to regulate the behaviour of database makers in a 
dominant position if unfair trading terms or excessive prices are imposed76.  Beyond that, 
and in the absence of the sui generis right, as between the database maker and the first 
comer the terms of the contract will regulate the bargain between the parties.  It is here 
that the Database Directive contains an important limitation on the contracting power of 
the database maker where the sui generis right subsists.  And it is here that the Database 
Directive may prove its worth, for users, in the database market.
Lawful users and the sui generis right.
There are limitations on the sui generis right provided for in the legislation.  The 
Directive contains a number of permissive exceptions which include extraction (but not 
re-utilisation) for the purposes of illustration for teaching or scientific research as long as 
the source is indicated and to the extent justified by the non-commercial purposes to be 
achieved.77 The weakness of these limitations is that their permissive nature means that 
take-up and implementation may vary from Member State to Member State.  They have 
been the subject of criticism.78
But of potentially greater import to the lawful user is that this person has the right to 
extract and/or re-utilise an insubstantial part of the contents of a database for whatever 
                                                
74 [2005] EWHC 3015 (Ch) (21 December 2005) 
75 Ibid Para 285
76 Ibid.  See OPSI report on its investigation of a complaint (SO 42/8/4).  Intelligent Addressing and 
Ordnance Survey.  July 2006. (OPSI investigation)
77
 Database Directive Article 9(b)
78 See above n. 2 and First Evaluation Para 4.
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purposes whatsoever.79 Critically, any contractual provision seeking to override this 
measure is null and void:80 in other words, a lawful user cannot be constrained from
making insubstantial extractions from a database, nor from re-utilising what has been 
extracted for any purposes whatsoever.81  It should be noted that this provision only 
applies to a ‘lawful’ user.  Unfortunately this term has not been defined in the legislation 
but it has been suggested that it refers to a person who lawfully acquires the database –
e.g. by way of gift, rental sale or as a licensee.82  Thus a first comer contracting with the 
maker of a geospatial database to extract and re-utilise the whole or a substantial part of 
the contents of the geospatial database would be a lawful user.83
Insubstantial/Substantial part
A key question in determining the extent of this right of a lawful user is to determine 
what amounts to an insubstantial part of the contents of the database.  Here two tests are 
relevant:  quantitative and qualitative.
Quantitative part
The ECJ has said that a substantial part evaluated quantitatively refers to the volume of 
data extracted from the database and must be assessed in relation to the volume of the 
contents of the whole of that database.  If a user extracts and/or re-utilises a 
quantitatively significant part of the contents of a database whose creation required the 
deployment of substantial resources, the investment in the extracted or re-utilised part is 
proportionately equally substantial.84
                                                
79
 Where authorised to extract and/or re-utilise only part of the database, then the right applies to only that 
part of the Database.  Database Directive Article 8.
80






 In implementing these provisions into UK law, the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997 
provide that ‘a lawful user of a database… shall be entitled to extract or re-utilise insubstantial parts of the contents of the 
database for any purpose and where under an agreement a person has a right to use a database, or part of a database,…any 
term or condition in the agreement shall be void in so far as it purports to prevent that person from extracting or re-utilising 
insubstantial parts of the contents of the database, or of that part of the database, for any purpose [emphasis added]..Reg 
19
84
 BHB Para 70.
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So how much is substantial?  The ECJ did not quote a figure or percentage when 
considering the cases before it.  In BHB despite having suggested that the investment 
was in the creation of the data per se, the ECJ went on to comment that the extraction 
by William Hill of the names of the horses running in a particular race, the date the time 
and/or name of the race and the name of the racecourse did not constitute a substantial 
part evaluated quantitatively – being only ‘a very small proportion’ of the whole of the 
database. Unfortunately there was not much indication of the size of the overall database.  
Some guidance may be taken from the part of the judgement in BHB dealing with the 
repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-utilisation of insubstantial parts of the 
contents of the database.85 On this, and in considering when such activities would 
infringe the sui generis right, the ECJ said that this measure 
‘prohibits acts of extraction…which could lead to the reconstruction of the database as a whole, or at the 
very least a substantial part of it…whether those acts were carried out with a view to the creation of 
another database or in the exercise of an activity other than the creation of a database’86.  
If a similar test is used in relation to determining a quantitatively substantial part of a 
database, it would appear that the threshold would seldom be reached.  Substantial must 
relate to something over 50% even if it did not result in reconstitution of the database. 
How big is a geospatial database?
An example might be the Ordnance Survey product, Mastermap. In August 2005 
(version 6 of Mastermap) the database containing the data was said to stand at 600
Gbytes in size.87  By comparison a large novel is 1 Mbyte, a compressed digital film is 10 
Gbytes; the annual production of refereed journal (~20k journals; ~2M articles) is 1
Tbyte, and the annual production of information (print, film, optical & magnetic media) 
is 1500 Pbytes.88
                                                
85
 Database Directive Article 7(5)
86
 BHB Para 87
87 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OS_MasterMap
88 The example is taken from Hey, T and Trefethen, A, The Data Deluge: An e-Science Perspective available at 
http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~ajgh/DataDeluge(final).pdf
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It may be that the owner of a geospatial database gathers data into one large database, 
but then splits that into other products.  For example, Google earth not only makes a 
product available for free, but it also has a number of other products for which it 
charges.89  Such a ‘splitting’ of the contents should not detract from the fact that there 
needs to be substantial investment in the database for the right to subsist.  Thus, if the 
original database cost, say, £1m, splitting that into ten separate products should not 
produce ten separate sui generis rights.  Rather the question should be as to whether 
substantial investment has been expended in any one of those products and thus whether 
the right subsists in that part of the database.  The more parts into which a database is 
split, the less likely it should be that the relevant investment would subsist in one small 
part.  If that were not the case, it would be possible for any database maker to ‘split’ a 
database into a large number of small databases, and yet claim rights in each – in effect 
avoiding the ‘quantitative’ rule.  
Qualitative part
A substantial part of the contents of the database is determined not only by a quantitative 
test, but also by a qualitative analysis which is a much more difficult criterion to operate.  
On the matter of a qualitative part of the contents of a database, this refers to ‘the scale of 
the investment in the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents … regardless of whether that 
represents a quantitatively substantial part of the general contents of the protected database’.  
The intrinsic value of the data must be ignored in deciding what, qualitatively, is a 
substantial part of a database.  To argue otherwise would be to accept that the data per se 
were protected.  Thus, in BHB it was irrelevant that the data extracted and reutilised by 
William Hill was essential to the organisation of the horse races organised by BHB and 
others.90 However it may also be that a quantitatively negligible part of the contents of a 
database may in fact represent, in terms of obtaining, verification or presentation,
significant investment.91 Determining what might amount to a qualitatively substantial 
part where there may have been large scale investment is far from easy – particularly 
where the concern is to avoid protecting datum per se.  So, for example, if £10 million is 
invested in the collation, verification and presentation of the data in a geospatial database
                                                
89 http://earth.google.com/
90 BHB Para 72
91
 Ibid Para 71.
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which is 1Tbyte, would taking of 1/10th of the database in which £1 million pro rata had 
been invested amount to qualitatively a substantial part?  Would £10,000 and 1/1000th of 
the database qualify?  What if the database is actually very small and consists of 1000 
pieces of data but in which £1 million has been spent on the relevant investment?  On 
this analysis it could be that the datum would be protected and that is clearly not within 
the thinking of the ECJ.  In a very expensive but small database, where is the dividing 
line between protection of data in which there has been a substantial investment in its
obtaining, verification and presentation, and protection of the data per se?  What level of 
investment is considered substantial and thus capable of protection?  
On both the quantitative and qualitative analysis there may be a desire to limit the rights 
of the lawful user by reference to the size of the final product.  So, for example, if the 
maker of a database contracts with a lawful user who wishes to produce maps, the maker 
may seek to restrict the size of the final map that can be disseminated by the lawful user 
– for example by limiting the representation of the map to a certain geographic area (e.g. 
no more than 2km(square)) or to size representation on paper (e.g. A3).  These 
considerations should be wholly irrelevant in determining a substantial part, assessed 
either quantitatively or qualitatively, of the database.  As discussed above, the tests 
require assessment of the investment in the database.  Only if that final product involved 
the extraction and re-use of a substantial part of the database would the maker have the 
power to determine how much might be reused.
The lawful user and the two step test
So a lawful user may not be enjoined from extracting and re-utilising an insubstantial part 
of the contents of a database.  As indicated above, whereas there is some guidance on 
what a quantitatively insubstantial part of a database might be (subject to further 
clarification on what amounts to substantial investment) much more difficult is the 
question of a qualitatively insubstantial part.  Again guidance on ‘how much’ amounts to 
substantial investment would help to clarify this test, but in its absence, there is a further 
provision in the database Directive that might aid interpretation.
Article 8.2 of the Directive states that any acts by the lawful user must not perform acts 
which:
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 conflict with the normal exploitation of the database, or 
 unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker of the database.92
The wording is familiar from the Berne Convention Article 9(2) which provides:
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the 
reproduction of such works
 in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction 
 does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
 does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.
This is commonly referred to as the Berne Three Step Test.  It has also been 
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement Article 13 where the word ‘confine’ is used 
instead of ‘permit’ and where its application has been extended beyond reproduction to 
all the other exclusive rights enjoyed by the copyright owner.  It is also found in the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty Article 10.
While the two step test in the Database Directive is modelled the three step test in the 
Berne Convention there are differences.  The Berne three step test is directed towards 
states as to what they may and may not put in their legislation; the Database Directive is
directed towards the activities of lawful users.  The Berne three step test includes 
reference to ‘certain special cases’ while the Directive does not contain this reference.93
                                                
92
 Database Directive Article 8.2
93 The two step test appears in the Database Directive but not in the UK implementing regulations.  The 
question arises as to what would happen if a case was raised before a national court.  Could the claimant 
rely on this provision?  In accordance with settled jurisprudence, and recently summarised by the ECJ in 
Vasiliki Nikoloudi v Organismos Tilepikoinonion Ellados AE. Case C-196/02, if the provisions of the Directive 
are unconditional and sufficiently precise then they may be relied upon by an individual claimant as against 
the State.  The State in this context is construed widely and includes bodies subject to the authority or 
control of the State or which have special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules 
applicable to relations between individuals (see, to this effect, Case C188/99 Foster and Others 1990 ECR 
I3313, paras 16, 18 and 20, and Case C-187/00 Kutz-Bauer 2003 ECR I2741, para 69).  However, 
obligations cannot be placed upon individuals and cannot be relied upon as such as against an individual 
(see, inter alia, Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori 1994 ECR I-3325, para 20, and Joined Cases C397/01 to C-
403/01 Pfeiffer and Others 2004 ECR I-0000, para 108).  But where a situation falls within the scope of a 
Directive, the national court is bound, when applying national law, to interpret it, so far as possible, in the 
light of the wording and the purpose of the Directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought by 
the Directive (see, inter alia, Case C-106/89 Marleasing 1990 ECR I-4135, para 8, Faccini Dori 1994 ECR I-
3325, para 26, and Pfeiffer and Others para 113).  This last is termed the ‘interpretative obligation’.  Looking 
to the wording of Article 8.2 it is both unconditional and precise, albeit that it requires to be interpreted.  
Should a claimant have a grievance against Ordnance Survey (the UKs largest geospatial data provider) 
then reliance could be placed on this Article as against that organisation which has ‘special powers’ arising 
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The two step test by analogy with the three step test
The Berne (and TRIPS) three step test has been the subject of academic analysis94 while 
the test as incorporated into TRIPS has been considered in some depth in a case heard 
before the WTO Panel concerning whether the United States Copyright Act section 
110(5) conformed to obligations to be found in the TRIPS agreement.95
The Berne Three step test evolved as the scope of the exclusive right of reproduction 
expanded.  During negotiations for the Stockholm Conference in 1964 it became clear 
that if the authors’ right of reproduction was to be all encompassing, so it would be 
necessary to consider the nature of limitations or restrictions on that right.96 Domestic 
laws of signatory states to the Berne Convention contained diverse limitations on subject 
matter.  What was needed was a general formula that might permit the introduction of 
other exceptions within domestic laws while at the same time recognising the 
commitment to the advancement of author’s rights.  These negotiations resulted in the 
Berne three step test.  This test means that if Berne Convention countries introduce 
limitations or exceptions on use of works protected by copyright in their domestic laws 
over and above both the limitations to be found in the remainder of the Berne 
Convention97  and the limitations in domestic laws present at the time of the Stockholm 
negotiations98 then they must be in conformity with the three step test.   
                                                                                                                                           
both from its position as an executive arm of the State and as a Trading fund.  If the claimant were seeking 
to litigate against an independent geospatial data provider (for example Getmapping), then the Court’s 
interpretative obligation may come into play. 
94 Ricketson, S and Ginsburg, J, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights:  the Berne Convention and Beyond 
Oxford 2006 (hereafter Ricketson and Ginsburg). Ricketson, S. WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Environment SCCR/9/7 (hereafter Ricketson WIPO); Ricketson, S. 
The Boundaries of Copyright:  Its Proper Limitations and  Exceptions–International Conventions and Treaties, (1999) 
IPQ 56-94; Ricketson, S. The Three-step Test, Deemed Quantities, libraries and Closed Exceptions,  Advice prepared 
for the Centre of Copyright Studies Ltd., Centre for Copyright Studies, Sydney 2003;  Ficsor, M. The Law of 
Copyright and the Internet, Oxford, 2002;  Reinbothe J., and von Lewinski S., The WIPO Treaties 1996, 
Butterworths LexisNexis, UK, 2002; Ginsburg, J. Towards Supranational Copyright Law?  The WTO Panel;  
Decision and the “Three-Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions [2001] Revue internationale du droit d’auteur, January 
2001.
95 United States - Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act - Report of the Panel DS160 June 15, 2000 (hereafter 
DS160).
96 See Ricketson and Ginsburg Chapter 13 generally.  
97 Ricketson and Ginsburg: ‘their operation is unaffected by it, and … the uses allowed under them are therefore excluded 
from its scope’ Para 13.10
98 ‘.. article 9(2) was conceived of as being capable of covering all existing exceptions to reproduction rights under national 
laws, apart from those already covered by other provisions of the Convention’.  Ricketson and Ginsburg, Para 13.25.
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By analogy, and looking to the wording in the Database Directive, it could be argued that 
over and above the right of the lawful user under the Database Directive to extract and 
re-utilise insubstantial parts of a database for any purpose, or act within one of the other 
permissive exceptions to be found in the Directive, a lawful user should be able to carry 
out acts so long as they did not conflict with the normal exploitation of the database or 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker of the database.
However, the juxtaposition of the two step test in the Database Directive needs to be 
considered.  The two step test is in Article 8.2 coming after the general right of lawful 
users to extract and re-utilise insubstantial parts of the contents of the database.  Thus 
the purpose of the two step test may be to operate as an interpretative aid as to what 
amounts to and what can be done with an insubstantial part of the contents of a database 
rather than as a ground on which the user can found arguments for greater relaxations. 
Either way, it could be used as a means by which interests of various parties within the 
database framework might be balanced and through which a clearer idea may be gained 
as to what amounts to an insubstantial part of a database.  
The options will be canvassed below.
WTO Panel on United States–Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act.
A starting point for discussion is the interpretation by the WTO Panel of Article 13 
TRIPS in the dispute that arose concerning s 110(5)(b) of the US Fairness in Music 
Licensing Act 1998.  This section exempted a majority of bars and restaurants and more 
than 45% of shops and boutiques in the US from having to pay copyright royalties for 
the public performance of music (through the use of TV or radio) in their premises.  The 
EC instigated proceedings against the US before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.  In 
finding that the exception was not in conformity with TRIPS the WTO Panel analysed 
TRIPS Article 13 in some depth.
Normal Exploitation
On the second part of the test, that of ‘normal exploitation’, the Panel focussed 
exclusively on economic reasoning to determine its breadth.  The Panel considered that 
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this step meant that an exception must not interfere with the normal mode in which the 
author exploits a work on the market whether currently or at some point in the future.  
Exempted uses should not compete with actual or potential sources of gain from 
economic exploitation of the right such as to deprive the author ‘of significant or tangible 
commercial gains’.99  
In considering whether a factor to be taken into account was the potential commercial 
gain to the user the Panel said ‘...in our view, not every use of a work, which, in principle is covered 
by the scope of exclusive rights and involves commercial gain, necessarily conflicts with a normal 
exploitation of that work.  If this were the case, hardly any exception or limitation could pass the test of 
the second condition and Article 13 might be left devoid of meaning, because normal exploitation would 
be equated with full use of exclusive rights.’ 100
In other words, the focus is on loss of actual and potential sources of gain to the author,
rather than on commercial benefit to the user from which it has been argued that 
‘Exceptions under national law that do not enter into economic competition (present or potential) with 
non-exempted uses should therefore not be contrary to the second condition of article 9(2) .’101  Although 
it would appear from the words used by the Panel that commercial gain to the user might 
be a factor to be taken into account as suggested by its use of the word ‘every’.
In coming to its decision, the Panel was exclusively concerned with economic reasoning.  
In other words, it was a quantitative assessment (however difficult particularly when 
looking to potential future gains). This approach has been the subject of academic 
criticism by commentators who argue that normative and not just economic factors 
should be brought to bear in deciding whether a particular use would conflict with 
normal exploitation.102  In this sense normative would include underlying public policy 
interests that shape the contours of the law. An example is given in the domain of 
research:  ‘an important question … where the exception relates to research and scholarship or to uses 
by libraries’103
Legitimate interests and unreasonable prejudice
                                                
99 DS160 Para 6.183
100 DS160 Para 6.182   
101 Ricketson and Ginsburg Para 3.18
102 Ricketson WIPO p25.
103 Ricketson and Ginsburg Para 13.20
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The third part of the Berne Three Step test mandates that any limitation should not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.  So what might these 
legitimate interests of the author be?  It has been argued that they are both economic and 
moral.104  Given the focus of the Berne Convention on the author, this conclusion seems 
reasonable. The Panel in the WTO case said that one way of looking at legitimate 
interests ‘is the economic value of the exclusive rights conferred by copyright on their holders’105 but
was also quick to point out that legitimate interests are not necessarily limited to this 
economic value suggesting a balancing test drawing on non-economic factors is indeed to 
be applied in determining its scope.  However these interests should be author centric as 
the focus of this part of the test is on the author rather than any wider public interest.  
Thus whereas moral interests such as the right of attribution should be respected the 
enquiry should not go further into wider public policy concerns.  If these are a factor, 
they should be confined to the second step.  
On the matter of the degree of prejudice might be considered as unreasonable, the Panel 
pointed out that ‘a certain amount of prejudice has to be presumed justified as ‘not unreasonable’.106
‘In our view, prejudice to the legitimate interests of right holders reaches an unreasonable level if an 
exception or limitation causes or has the potential to cause an unreasonable loss of income to the copyright 
owner.’
So once again the Panel was concerned with economic analysis and the interests of the 
right holders.  Nonetheless it is clear that not all loss of income to the copyright owner 
would be considered as prejudicial as this would not be considered unreasonable.  Some 
have suggested a proportionality test could satisfy this condition.  Where prejudice 
suffered by the author might be considered unreasonable, conditions could be included 
to make that prejudice reasonable.  An example might be the introduction of a 
compensation scheme where the number of copies made of a particular work exceeds a
number considered to result in reasonable loss of income.107
                                                
104 Ricketson and Ginsburg Para 13.24
105 DS160 Para 6.227
106 DS160 Para 6.229
107 Ricketson and Ginsburg Para 13.26
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The two step test and the Database Directive
Going beyond copyright, what then are the implications for the ‘two step test’ to be 
found in the Database Directive?108
As suggested above, the Berne three step test is directed towards ensuring that authors 
are protected under national laws and that those national laws are in compliance with the 
obligations to be found in the Berne Convention.  The Database Directive is addressed 
to Member States but the specific Article (8) in the Directive concerns the rights and 
obligations of lawful users of the contents of a database rather than setting parameters 
for Member States should they decide to introduce further exceptions to the sui generis
right.
So the first line of enquiry – that the two step test is over and above the right of lawful 
users to extract and re-utilise insubstantial parts of a database - is as to what a lawful user 
might be able to do over and above extracting and re-utilising an insubstantial part of the 
contents of a database for any purpose which, but for the two step test, would fall within 
the sui generis right of the maker.
A lawful user may not perform acts with conflict with the normal exploitation of 
the database  
It will be recalled that the primary function of the Database Directive is to protect the 
investment of database makers.  This is reflected not only in the recitals and Articles of 
the Directive, but also in the ECJs rulings in the Database cases.  That court stressed that 
the relevant investment was to: ‘promote the establishment of storage and processing systems for 
existing information.’109 So it is not just investment in general that is the focus of the 
enquiry, but investment in the establishment of storage and processing systems.  Thus 
                                                
108 Note also that Article 7(5) of the Directive provides that repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-
utisisation of insubstantial parts of the contents of the database implying acts which conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the database or which unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker shall not 
be permitted.  This was the subject of analysis by the ECJ in BHB where the court said the purpose of this 
was to prevent extractions and re-utilisation the cumulative effect of which would be to seriously prejudice 
the investment by the maker of the database.  This was ‘for the purpose of reconstituting, through the 
cumulative effects of extraction’ the whole or a substantial part of the database and thus prejudicing the 
investment by the maker of the database. Para 89.  For comment see Aplin p146.
109
 BHB Para 31
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any activities by lawful users should not conflict with the normal exploitation of the 
database where those activities impact on the relevant investment of the database maker
– other economic harms should not be relevant
The nature of the right under discussion should also be borne in mind.  Normal 
exploitation of a geospatial database may involve the licensing of the data to third parties
– i.e. licensing of the database right to extract and/or re-utilise the whole or a substantial 
part of the contents.  But normal exploitation of the database should not be conflated 
with the development or exploitation of products or works that may be derived from 
manipulation of the data.  Quite different rights are likely to subsist when that data has 
been further manipulated and, for example, rendered in graphic form by a third party
(e.g. copyright in a map).  Those rights would not lie with the database maker, but with
those who have manipulated the data to render it in a meaningful and visible form.  Even 
where the database maker might manipulate their own data to produce outputs which 
compete with third parties to whom the data are licensed, such exploitation should not 
be taken into account in determining the range of ‘normal exploitation’ of the database.  
To do otherwise would be to leverage the database right into adjacent markets where 
exploitation (and competition) is on the basis of quite different underlying rights.
Thus any economic prejudice to the database maker should be considered in relation to 
the economic investment in, and potential exploitation from, the database and not the 
downstream products.  In this way, there would only be conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the database to the extent that a use by a third party entered into 
competition with the database maker qua database maker.  For instance if a lawful user 
collected insubstantial parts of the contents of the database originally obtained from the 
maker such that a substantial part of the original database was reconstructed, and made 
available through a competing database, then there would be no room to claim that such 
behaviour was excused on the grounds of this step of the two step test as the activity 
would such as to deprive the maker ‘of significant or tangible commercial gains’.110
Indeed such behaviour is already enjoined by the Directive. 111
Problems may however arise where processes are carried out on data by the lawful user.  
Here arguments as to the underlying public interest may be relevant.  For instance a 
                                                
110 DS160 Para 6.183
111 Database Directive Article 7.5  see also fn 108 above
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geospatial database maker makes a substantial part of the database available to a lawful 
user under contract.  That lawful user might then carry out extensive (and expensive) 
checks (verification) and other manipulation on the data such that when complete, the 
data look little like those originally derived from the first database.112  Would the making 
available of those derived data deprive the original maker of ‘significant tangible 
commercial gains’?  There certainly might be gain to the user but as we have seen, that is 
not (as) relevant as loss to the original maker.  The answer of course might be yes – the 
original database maker may be deprived of gains because third parties might prefer to 
licence the manipulated data rather than the original.  Would there then be room to argue 
that the wider public interest possibly underlying the operation of this second step of the 
test should come into play?  It seems for instance that there is a broad public interest in 
ensuring that resources are not wasted in duplicating effort as where a downstream party 
has to revert to the original database maker and perform its own expensive operations on 
the data to come to the same conclusions as the original lawful user.  A fortiori where 
public funding might have been expended in the manipulation of the data113 or there is a 
desire to make it available for research and education.114
Control over derived data brings other issues:  if derived data on which substantial 
investment has been expended can be controlled by the original database maker, this is to 
reach the powers of the database maker into adjacent markets.  It means that the original 
database maker is claiming to itself the value of the investment in downstream 
derivations and perhaps also the ownership of the resulting product.  In the competition 
law field, public policy has already come to regulate such behaviour in the arena of 
patent, know-how and software copyright licensing agreements.115  There are compelling 
arguments to say that such behaviour should not be permitted under the Database 
Directive.  Whether the rather uncertain public policy considerations underlying this part 
of the test would be capable of being brought to bear in such a scenario is a moot point.  
The step as a guide to the interpretation of ‘substantial part’
                                                
112 There is a temptation here to argue by analogy with the law of copyright – where significant 
emendations are made to a work then it can form a new work. But the sui generis right is a different right 
and should perhaps not be interpreted through copyright eyes.  
113 See e.g. Waelde, C and McGinley M, Public Domain; Public Interest; Public Funding: focussing on the ‘three Ps’ in 
scientific research, (2005) 2:1 SCRIPT-ed 83 @: http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrb/script-ed/vol2-1/3ps.asp 
Three ps
114 Ricketson and Ginsburg ibid n 94.
115 Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements (TTBER). 
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Thus this first part of the two step test could be useful in judging whether the activities 
of a user are lawful especially if there is a public interest argument that might be brought 
to bear.  This also brings in the second line of enquiry – that the two step test may be 
used as an interpretive aid as to the rights of lawful users in relation to an insubstantial 
part of the contents.  
As has been discussed above, the meaning of ‘qualitatively’ a substantial part of a 
database is hard to determine and there is much room for debate.  Reverting to the 
example given above concerning a geospatial database of 1Tbyte and a third party 
wanting to publish a map containing data derived from the database.  There it was 
questioned as to what level of investment amounted to a substantial part.  Assume now 
that the pro rata investment in the part to be reused is £50000.  At this level it becomes 
harder to argue that it is qualitatively an insubstantial part of the database even though it 
is currently unknown what the absolute level of investment should be for subsistence of 
the right.  But assume also that the purpose for which the extraction is to be used is to 
manipulate the data to create a map to be included within a scholarly journal article.  This 
use most certainly does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the database.  The 
normal exploitation of the database is to licence the contents of the database to third 
parties and not to create maps for research purposes.  Public policy considerations in the 
advancement of science may argue for this to be judged a qualitatively insubstantial part 
of the database.
Legitimate interests
On the question of legitimate interests it will be recalled that the Panel considered that 
these included, even if they were not limited to, the economic value of the rights 
conferred by copyright on their holders.  As with the discussion above, given that the 
interests of the makers of the database are almost exclusively economic then it is those 
legitimate interests that should be considered.  Once again if an enquiry focuses on the 
ways in which the maker exploits the database then any prejudice to the legitimate 
interests would require an assessment of the impact of the use by a lawful user on the 
investment that the maker has or might be prepared to put into developing the storage 
and processing system.  If this is compromised then so the legitimate interests of the 
31
maker will be prejudiced.  A database maker is only likely to suffer unreasonable loss of 
income where a lawful user creates a database that can be substituted for the original 
product.  That, as with ‘normal exploitation’ is likely only to be the data in its original raw 
form – and not where processes have been carried out on it – as it is unlikely, at that 
point, to be a substitutable product.
Beyond that, it has been suggested that legitimate interests should include moral as well 
as economic.  But this argument is made in the context of authors’ rights where moral 
interests are integral to the construct.  It is hard to argue that there are equivalent 
interests of a database maker that go beyond the economic to the moral. Certainly a 
database maker may wish to be credited as being the source of the original data but such 
identification cannot be equated with the moral right of attribution adhering to authors 
of creative works116.
There is much to be said for deploying the two step test as an aid to interpretation of 
what amounts to an insubstantial part of the contents of the database.  Where the 
economic interests of the database maker are not harmed,117 where there is no loss of 
significant economic gain to the database maker, and where public policy considerations 
could be taken into account so the parameters of what is meant by an insubstantial part 
of a database could develop balancing the interests of all those affected in this area
Conclusion
Much of this discussion has been speculative.  The concern, as stated at the outset, was 
to consider how useful the Database Directive might be for lawful users using geospatial 
data as a case study.  It was suggested that for this constituency there might be merit in 
retaining the Directive despite its unproven value for the database industry.  The 
boundaries might be uncertain but with the Directive in place a lawful user has rights 
which, without the Directive, would not exist.118
                                                
116 Berne Convention Article 6bis 1.
117 This is not a requirement for infringement of the sui generis right BHB Para 47
118 Commentators have for a number of years been debating the limits on IP rights, and the extent to 
which either or both of competition law and human rights might act as a temper on the exercise of those 
rights.  Some argue that factors taking into account these areas should be and are already built into the 
rights.  Deploying the two step test in the ways suggested above would be find room for them also within 
database law.  For a research project mapping the interfaces between IP, competition and human rights see 
www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrb and Brown A and Waelde, C Intellectual Property, Competition and Human Rights: the 
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What also needs investigation is how the market might structure itself with, and without 
the database right in place.  Many comments have been made in relation to the utility of 
private ordering.  It has been argued by some that, as contractual relationships are 
difficult to enforce as between second and third comers (beyond the lawful user or first 
comer) so in reality control cannot be exerted over data (multiple users with shallow 
pockets).119 Those arguments are usually made in the context of click-wrap or browse-
wrap licences in the densely populated sphere of Internet bargaining and mass market 
contracting.120  In the more organised world of science however the situation differs.  It 
is a world populated by scientists who know something of the law and are generally law 
abiding.  Whether they work within public or private institutions they are buttressed by 
systems within often risk-averse organisations keen to remain within the boundaries of 
the law and bargains. With or without the database directive in place, it is unrealistic to 
believe that databases are going to be developed and their contents made available for 
free.  But this begs a whole series of questions as to how the industry might be structured 
with the database Directive in place as compared to what it might look like without that 
protection.  How might, for instance, the price of access compare as between having the 
database directive in place and not having the database directive in place?  Might it be 
lower with the database directive in place because of the ability to control re-utilisation of 
a substantial part?  What does the structure of the scientific database market look like as 
between systems with protection and those without? Would licensing strategies, 
dependent on innumerable factors, differ with and without protection and in whose 
favour might they operate?121 Without the Directive and competition law aside, it would 
seem that there is nothing to stop database makers refusing to permit entry to their 
databases to third parties either at all, or only at a price and on conditions dictated by the 
                                                                                                                                           
past, the present and the future, (2005) 2:4 SCRIPT-ed 450 @:   http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrb/script-ed/vol2-
4/utopia.asp.
119 Conley J.M et. al, Database Protection in a Digital World, 6 Rich J.L. & Tech. 2, (Symposium 1999) 
http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6i1/conley.html
120 For an argument in favour of these mechanisms on the Internet see Stone R. and Pernick, J. Protecting 
Databases:  copyright?  We don’t need no stinkin’ copyright
1999 Computer Lawyer Vol. 16 No. 2: 17-21
121 See generally Licensing Geographic Data and Services.  Also for discussion on how a contractual 
research commons might develop Reichman J and Uhlir P A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for 
Scientific Data: International Considerations in Digital Data and Weiss, P. 2002. Borders in Cyberspace: Conflicting 
Public Sector Information Policies and Their Economic Impacts—Summary Report, at 
http://weather.gov/sp/Borders_report.pdf for discussion on conflicts between government policies to the 
protection and exploitation of publicly funded data.  
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maker conditions which may seek control over even the smallest portion of data within 
the database enforceable at least as against first comers.122  
Before jettisoning the Directive what is needed is much clearer guidance on what 
amounts to an insubstantial part, and consideration as to how the two step test might be 
deployed in ensuring that the economic interests of the maker are balanced with those of 
a lawful user and wider public policy concerns.   That investigation needs to take place 
within the broader context of a consideration of the scientific database industry as a 
whole and most importantly with the interests of users of data firmly in mind.
                                                
122 What is interesting is that the provisions making it unlawful to circumvent technological measures 
(Directive 2002/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society Article 6.3) only 
come into play where the sui generis right subsists.  Thus, if a database is not protected by the sui generis 
right then it is not unlawful to circumvent technical measures that might be guarding access to the 
contents.  This might suggest that lawful users would be better of without the Database Directive in place 
as they could simply hack into the contents without fear of liability.  However this is not a practical 
suggestion for technical luddites (like myself) and it is possible that the courts might, in the face of 
widespread hacking, find alternative causes of action for the database maker, such as trespass to chattels. 
See for example Ebay v Bidders Edge 100 F.Supp. 2d 1058. 
